Kay Goff v. Annette Goff : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2001
Kay Goff v. Annette Goff : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David K. Winder; Strong and Hanni; Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant.
Richard Richards; Attorney for Plaintiff and respondent.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Goff v. Goff, No. 13893.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/1066
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF L ^ I ^ R Y 
KAYGOFF, ) D E C 9 197R 
Plaintiff and Respondent, I 
_ v g _ BRiGIIAM <¥©UN$H*NIVERS!TY 
J. keif en Qakfcaw School 
ANNETTE DOBLE GOFF, I /£&$? 
Defendant and Appellant. I 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Judgment of the 
Second District Court for Weber County 
Honorable Calvin Gould, District Judge 
DAVID K. WINDER 
STRONG & HANNI 
604 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant amd 
Appellcmt 
RICHARD RICHARDS 
670 28th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84403
 n - r*
3
 T% 
Attorney for Plamtiff and \f* | 1 ^ 1 ^ 
Respondent * V C D 1. M197 S 
i 
CU?t Supram© Court, i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
NATURE OF THE CASE 1 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 2 
ARGUMENT 9 
POINT I. 
THE PROPER TEST FOR DETERMINING 
GUEST STATUS UNDER THE FACTS OF 
THIS CASE WAS WHETHER THE COM-
PENSATION WAS THE CHIEF INDUCE-
MENT FOR THE CARRIAGE BASED UPON 
THAT TEST, THE COURT SHOULD HAVE 
FOUND AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT 
THE PLAINTIFF WAS A GUEST IN HIS 
SON'S AUTOMOBILE 9 
POINT II. 
NO BUSINESS TRIP WAS INVOLVED AT 
THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT THAT 
COULD REMOVE THE PLAINTIFF FROM 
THE EFFECT OF THE GUEST STATUTE .... 22 
CONCLUSION 25 
CASES CITED 
Eyre v. Bnrdette, 
8 Utah 2d 166, 330 P.2d 126 (1958) 16 
Greenhalgh v. Green, 
16 Utah 2d 221, 398 P.2d 691 (1965) 13, 14, 15 
Jensen v. Mower, 
4 Utah 2d 336, 294 P.2d 683 (1956) 9, 10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
: TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 
. Page 
Mukasey v. Aaron, . . . . 
20 Utah 2d 383, 438 P.2d 702 (1968) .22, 23, 24 
Smith v. Franklin, 14 Utah 2d 16, 
376 P.2d 541 (1962) 10, 11, 12, 13, 18 
Willden v. Kennecott Copper Corporation, 
25 Utah 2d 96, 476 P.2d 687 (1970) ..:....;..15, 16 
TEXTS 
U.C.A., 1953, 41-9-2 9 
39 A.L.E. 3d 1224 16 
39 A.L.B. 3d 1240 20 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KAY GOFF, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
Case No. 
-vs— \ 
57116 
ANNETTE DOBLE GOFF, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT'APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This was an action by plaintiff-respondent (here-
after called Kay Goff or plaintiff) against defendant-
appellant (hereafter called Annette Doble Goff or de-
fendant) for damages for plaintiff's bodily injuries and 
which resulted from an automobile accident that oc-
curred on January 22,1973. The sole issue involved before 
the Trial Court and which is involved on this appeal con-
cerns whether at the time the accident occurred the plain-
tiff was or was not a guest and as that term is defined in 
41-9-2, U.C.A. 1953. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial of this case was heard on September 10, 
1974 before the Honorable Calvin Gould, in and for 
Weber County, Utah, sitting without a jury, the same 
1 
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having been waived by both parties. Thereafter and 
by Memorandum Decision dated September 20, 1974, the 
Court found in favor of the plaintiff and against the 
defendant and thereafter formal Findings of Fact, Con-
clusions of Law and a Judgment were entered. 
BELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the Trial Court's ver-
dict and seeks a Judgment in defendant's favor and as 
against the plaintiff of no cause of action. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case involves a claim for damages for person-
al injuries by the plaintiff and against the defendant 
and relating to an automobile accident that occurred on 
January 22, 1973. At the trial the attorneys for both 
parties waived a jury and tried the only issue that was 
in dispute to the Trial Judge. As stipulated to in the 
Trial Transcript, the defendant's attorney agreed that 
there was liability in favor of the plaintiff and against 
the defendant and if the plaintiff was found not to be 
a "guest" and as defined in 41-9-2, U.C.A. 1953. The 
defendant's attorney further stipulated that if any re-
covery was allowable that it should be in the amount of 
$10,000.00, those being the policy limits of the defen-
dant's insurance policy, and since the injuries suffered 
by the plaintiff entitled him to at least that amount. By 
reason of these stipulations, the trial was a short one 
and only covered 36 pa^ges of transcript. 
Considering that the Trial Judge ruled in the plain-
tiff's favor and against the defendant, the defendant 
2 
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recognizes that this court must consider the facts in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff. Therefore, most 
of this Statement of Facts will be just as the Trial Judge 
stated what he believed the facts to be and as contained 
in his Memorandum Decision, most of which is quoted 
as follows: 
"The facts surround a family relationship of 
mother, father, two sons and the fiancee of each 
son. The father is one Kay Goff, who had some 
earlier bodily injuries, and who had received a 
written communication to appear before the Bail-
road Eetirement Board in Salt Lake City. Kay 
Goff and his wife Sarah Goff reside in River-
dale, Utah, a suburb of Ogden, in a residence 
near the North Gate of Hill Air Force Base. John 
XJ. Goff is their 29 year old son, who appears 
quite uneducated and was employed as a garbage 
hauler for a private refuse company. The son 
John owns an automobile, but the parents do 
not own an automobile. Annette Goff was the fi-
ancee of John's brother, now married to John's 
brother. John's fiancee, Dianne, and Annette 
were engaged in selling 'Tupperware', and were 
required to be in Salt Lake City, Utah, for a Tup-
perware sales meeting on Monday morning. The 
Sunday evening prior to the meeting, Annette 
asked John for the use of John's car to make a 
trip to Salt Lake City, Utah. John agreed, but 
next morning instead of loaning the car, John 
elected to 'lay off from work Monday and drive 
Annette and Dianne to Salt Lake City for the 
meeting. Upon learning of the trip, Kay Goff, 
needing to travel to the Railroad Retirement 
Board in Salt Lake City, asked if he could go 
and offered to pay for the gas if he and Sarah 
Goff could ride to Salt Lake City, Utah. Next 
" morning John arose early and traveled to his 
place of employment to arrange his layoff. He 
$ 
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then returned to Kay Goff 's residence, whereup-
on he was given $5.00 by Sarah for the trip. John 
then traveled into Ogden to a service station at 
13th and Wall Avenue and used $4.00 of the 
money for gas, and placed $1.00 in his pocket 
which he used for lunch later in the week. After 
purchasing gas, John picked up Annette and Di-
anne at their homes, which were within a few 
blocks of the gasoline station. It should be noted 
at this point that John had access to the Inter-
state Highway 15 to Salt Lake City via 12th 
Street, and could have entered 1-15 to Salt Lake 
City at several locations without returning to the 
home of his parents in Eiverdale. When asked 
why he returned to his parents' home, he an-
swered 'They give me $5.00 for gas.' John did re-
turn to his parents' home, entered the driveway, 
and left the car to go into the house to get his 
parents. At this point Annette slid under the 
steering wheel, it being her intention to drive the 
car to Salt Lake City. John brought his parents 
out of the house and Kay and Sarah entered the 
car and sat in the rear passenger compartment. 
Annette, Dianne and John all sat in the front 
passenger compartment with Annette driving. 
"Approaching Salt Lake City, Utah, near the 
Beck Street exit from 1-15, Annette was distract-
ed by an accident scene on the northbound leg of 
Interstate 15 and ran into the rear of a car di-
rectly in the traffic lane ahead of her. The col-
lision caused serious injuries to Kay Goff for 
which he seeks recovery." 
As indicated above by Judge Gould in his Memor-
andum Decision, the plaintiff's son and the owner of the 
car involved in the accident, John Goff, did testify that 
the reason he returned to his parents' home to give his 
father a ride was because his parents gave him $5.00 for 
4 
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gas. (TR 31) This testimoney was elicited from John 
Goff by plaintiff's attorney. However, on cross-
examination by defendant's attorney, the following ques-
tions and answers were given on this same general sub-
ject matter by John Goff. 
"CROSS-EXAMINATION 
"BY MR. MIDGLEY: 
"Q. Now, Mr. Goff, when, on the morning I be-
lieve it was of the Monday yon happened to 
mention to your folks that you were going to Salt 
Lake? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And Annette had asked you the day before 
if she could drive your car to Salt Lake? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And you said yes? 
"A. (Nods head.) 
"Q. Is that correct? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And you knew that Dianne was going with 
Annette to the Tupperware meeting in Salt Lake? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And so if they took your car, I presume you 
assumed they would put the gas in it, is that 
right? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And you were engaged to Dianne at that 
time? 
"A. Yes. 
I 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"Q. So then you decided you would drive down 
with them? 
" A . Y e s . ' • • • ^ \ ^ v " 
"Q. Because you were engaged to Dianne and 
that would be a nice pleasure trip, wouldn't it? 
"A. Yes v ; • 
"Q. Yeah. And then as I understand it, your 
mother and father said Veil, as long as you are 
going to Salt Lake, can we ride down'? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And you said 'certainly'? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q And you would have taken them down 
whether they gave you any money or not, 
wouldn't you? 
"A. Yes 
"Q. Surely. But they offered you $5.00 to help 
out with the expense of the car ? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And they have done that before, haven't 
they? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. I believe your dad said that he always likes 
to pay his own way. So then you had already 
agreed with your folks that they could ride to 
Salt Lake City with you? 
"A. (Nods head.) 
"Q. So you went and got the gas and picked the 
girls up and then you went back to pick your folks 
up? 
"A. Yes. 
6 
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"Q. Now, having told them they could ride with 
you, why you would have gone and picked them 
up anyhow, whether they had given you any 
money or not, wouldn't you? 
"A. {Nods head.) 
"Q. You would like to keep your word with 
them, I guess, wouldn't you? 
"A. Yes/' (TR 32-34 emphasis added) 
The record is quite clear that John Goff did not ask 
his father or parents for the $5.00 nor did he ever con-
dition their being allowed to ride in his car upon them 
giving him the $5.00. This appears from the testimony 
of Sarah Goff (plaintiff's wife) who testified on this 
subject matter as follows: 
"Q. So as I understand it, you and your hus-
band asked if you could ride down so that your 
husband could go to the railroad? 
"A. (Nods head.) 
"Q. Is that correct? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And you just volunteered and gave him 
$5.00? 
"A. Yes, we give him $5.00. 
"Q. John didn't ask you for it, you just gave it 
to him? 
"A. We just gave it to him." (TR 24) 
To some extent the testimony of the plaintiff at the 
trial contradicts the testimony of his wife just quoted, 
although it was clear from his pretrial deposition that 
I 
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his testimony on this subject agreed with her's. His tes-
timony in his deposition was as follows: 
"Q. Now when you say you gave John the 
$5.00— 
': "A. Yes, sir. "'••'•' 
"Q. —what was the reason for that? 
"A. To pay for my wife and I going on the trip 
,/•:, down there with him. I had to be hauled around. 
"Q. Well, you just didn't want to be a free-
loader? 
"A. That's right. We always pay. That's right. 
"Q. And you just offered $5.00 to pay for the 
expense? 
"A. Well, we paid $5.00. 
"Q. That was just to help with the expense of 
the gasoline and the car? 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. Had John demanded $5.00 from you? 
"A. No." (Dep. of Plaintiff pp 5 and 6.) 
Concerning this deposition, it is to be noted that 
both parties agreed at the conclusion of the trial that 
the Trial Judge could consider the deposition of the 
plaintiff. (TR 36) It is further to be noted that at the 
time of the accident, and in addition to the others in the 
car who are mentioned by Judge Gould in his Memoran-
dum Decision that there was also present Shane School-
craft, a four-year old grandchild of the plaintiff and his 
wife, who was sitting with them in the back seat of the 
ear. 
8 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PROPER TEST FOR DETERMIN-
ING GUEST STATUS U N D E R THE 
FACTS OF THIS CASE WAS WHETHER 
THE COMPENSATION WAS THE CHIEF 
INDUCEMENT FOR THE CARRIAGE. 
BASED UPON THAT TEST, THE COURT 
SHOULD HAVE FOUND AS A MATTER OF 
LAW THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS A 
GUEST IN HIS SON'S AUTOMOBILE. 
The section of the statute which is involved in this 
case is as follows: 
"41-9-2. 'Guest7 Defined — For the purpose of 
this section the term 'guest' is hereby defined as 
being a person who accepts a ride in any vehicle 
without giving compensation therefor." 
The first Utah case to consider the question of "com-
pensation" was Jensen v. Mower, 4 Utah 2d 336, 294 P. 
2d 683 (1956). In the Jensen case, the defendant driver 
had posted an advertisement at his place of employment 
seeking riders, and he had quoted a weekly price for 
transportation which was comparable to bus fare. Plain-
tiff and others agreed to carriage under those terms and 
it was further part of the understanding that the week-
ly rate would be charged whether the plaintiff rode or 
not and as long as the defendant drove. There were no 
facts in the Jensen case to indicate any basis for the 
carriage other than that the defendant wished to be paid 
and that the plaintiff agreed to pay a particular amount 
in return .for the transportation. On those facts, the 
Trial Court in the Jensen case did find compensation 
f 
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had been paid sufficient to take the plaintiff out from 
under the Guest Statute and the Supreme Court affirm-
ed that finding. However, the Supreme Court in the 
Jensen case was careful to make it clear that a rider 
didn't cease to be a guest in every circumstance where 
money was paid to the owner or driver, and on this sub-
ject matter the Court stated as follows: 
"As indicated in the language quoted from Am. 
Jur. the cases turn not on whether money is re-
ceived or paid as a result of carrying the rider, 
but upon the fact that the money or other con-
sideration was given to the driver, not as a gra-
tuity or in appreciation but rather as an induce-
ment for making the trip for the rider or furn-
ishing carriage for the ride. If the driver extends 
the courtesy of a ride to a friend without more 
or takes on a hiker overtaken on the highway, 
the status of guest in either case is not replaced 
by that of passenger if gas is purchased, meals 
purchased or cash given to assist the driver in 
meeting the expenses of the trip. Such rider is 
not in the car because of any compensation or 
payment which induced the driver to give the 
ride. That the driver had already done." 
The Jensen case differs, of course, from the instant 
case inasmuch as the only inducement for the ride being 
granted in the Jensen case was on monetary considera-
tions and there was no countervailing question of social 
incentive for the ride and as there is in the instant case. 
A case decided after the Jensen case and which in-
volved a situation where there was both a monetary and 
a social inducement for the ride was Smith v. FrcmJclm, 
14 Utah 2d 16, 376 P. 2d., 541 (1962). In the Smith case, 
10 
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the evidence was thai i^u. un defendant and uie plain 
tiff's decedent were young women and cousins who re-
sided in Tooele, Utah. On the date in question in that 
case, the deceased told the defendant that she needed !<• 
;rii h- Sah i..ike from Tooele to ohtain a loaa and asked 
the defendant i<» drive her th'*re. When the defendant 
advised the plaintiff's decedent that she did not have 
any money for gasoline, the deceased agreed to pay $2.00 
so that gas could be obtained and the defendant indi-
cated that she thought this amount \v«:-i!d he sufficient 
to buy gas for the trip. After the youuu; women had 
come to Salt Lake City and were returning to Tooele, 
the accident occurred and the plaintiff's decedent was 
killed as a result thereof. 
t MI Hie j'aHs just recited, the Tihi. t'ourt submitted 
the issue of whether ot not the plaintiff's decedent wa> 
a guest to the jury. Tin* jury found that she was a guest 
and in favor of Hie defendant. Upon appeal, the plain-
tiff contended, among other points, that the Trial Court 
should have ruled as a matter of law that she was not 
a guest. The Supreme Court rejected that argument 
and affirmed the Judgment entered in favor of the de-
fendant in ihr Trial Tourl. Considering that the jur> 
had ruled as it did in the Smith ease, the majority de-
cision, authored by Justice Crockett, did not find it nec-
essary to decide whether the Trial Court properly could 
have ruled as a matter of law that the decedent was a 
guest on those facts and therefore removed that issue1 
from the jury. In their concurring opinions in Hie Smith 
case, both Justices Wade and Henriod stated it as their 
opinion that the evidence was susceptible of <ml\ one in 
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terpretation on this issue and this was that the decedent 
was a guest as a matter of law. Therefore, they con-
cluded that that issue should not have been submitted 
to the jury at all. 
In his majority opinion in the Smith case, Justice 
Crockett further refined the test relating to compen-
sation and which had been earlier enunciated in the Jen-
sen case and as it now applied to a situation where both 
a monetary and social inducement existed for the car-
riage. On this subject matter, Justice Crockett stated 
as follows: 
"The test is simple to state and under most cir-
cumstances is easy to apply: a passenger for hire 
is one who pays for his ride; a guest is one who 
is furnished a ride free of charge. The former 
is in the nature of a business transaction for 
money; whereas the latter is motivated by other 
considerations, usually of a social nature. Dif-
ficulties are encountered where both factors are 
present in such a way that it does not appear with 
sufficient certainty to justify a ruling as a mat-
ter of law either that the rider was a guest or 
a passenger for hire. Where such uncertainty 
exists, the definition given by Sec. 41-9-2, U.C.A. 
1953, that a guest is 'a person who accepts a ride 
in any vehicle without giving compensation there-
for,' does not provide the conclusive answer. The 
question arises as to what constitutes 'compen-
sation' sufficient to change what normally would 
f be a guest to a passenger for hire. 
"It must be conceded that where it is shown that 
the rider is basically a social guest, neither the 
giving of just 'any compensation,' which might 
be some inconsequential amount of money or 
other consideration of value, nor even the shar-
12 
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,;,t_, i>\ expenses, merely in Mtcia! reciprocation 
for the ride, would change the relationship to 
that of passenger for hire. The phrase 'compen-
sation therefor' as used in the statute means com-
pensation for1 the^ ride. Therefore, it would have 
to be sufficient money (or other thing of value) 
that it reasonably could be supposed that the 
parties so regarded it. But whether there is prof-
li <n the transaction is obviously not the deter-
mining factor. Vvhere payment for the ride is 
the main inducement for it, the fact that there 
may also exist some social incentive which makes 
giving the ride enjoyable or desirable for the 
drivei* would not change its character to that of 
host and guest. 
" I Vom our consideration of this subject and the 
authorities which have dealt with it, wo are per-
suaded that the sound and practical view is that 
the determination should be made1 on tin1 basis 
of which was the chief inducement for giving the 
r ide. ' ' (emphasis added) 
The later case of GreenhalgJi v. Green, \u Utah lid 
221, 398 P.2d 691 (1965), involved another fact situation 
where the plaintiff passenger had. agreed to pay and 
did pay a stun for gas on tin- trip and hefore the acci-
dent in (juesthm. !n the GreenhalgJicase, the facts were 
undisputed and were as follows: The plaintiff, Green-
halgh, the defendant and a third person had jointly 
planned a deer hunt similar to one they had enjoyed be-
fore. The defendant was to supply the camper ami the 
other two a g w d io hhare ail costs. Durinj; the course 
of their Irin, the defendant was driving an 1 oecame in-
volved in :re. accident causing the plaintiff's injuries. 
Prior Jo the accident, the plaintiff had paid $6.45 for 
I? 
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gas. On the facts just recited, the Trial Court (through 
then District Court Judge EUett) granted a summary 
judgment in favor of the defendant and on the basis 
that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff could not be other 
than a guest and under these circumstances. The Su-
preme Court affirmed that decision and in a per curiam 
decision stated as follows: 
"It is axiomatic that when a trip is for a social 
purpose, not conditioned on contribution for the 
benefit of the carrier, the passengers are guests 
though they agree to share the costs of the trip 
or purchase gas, oil or meals on the trip. The 
fact that a passenger pays traveling expenses as 
an act of social reciprocation, courtesy or amenity 
does not make a paying passenger one who other-
wise might be a guest. 
"Green was not induced to provide the truck for 
the hunting trip because plaintiff paid $6.45 for 
gas. Even sharing costs, Green was supplying 
his truck free of charge. This trip was social. 
It was a common courtesy for plaintiff to share 
the gas expense. Plaintiff clearly was a guest 
and not a passenger for hire, and a reasonable 
man could not find otherwise. Hence, the sum-
mary judgment was not error. 
"Plaintiff bases his entire case on Smith v, 
Franklin. There the passenger, as distinguished 
from this case, induced the car owner to carry 
her. The jury found the passenger to be a guest. 
That case is not a precedent or a rule that cases 
involving the Utah Guest Statute always are to 
be determined by a jury. The judge, in his dis-
cretion, gave the case to the jury. The appeal 
was on alleged erroneous instructions. This 
court is well aware that a summary judgment 
14 
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cannot be given if there exists a genuine issue of 
fact. But no issue of fact exists when patently 
it is clear that plaintiff was a guest." 
A case decided still later and which touches on this 
same question was Willden v. Kennecott Copper Cor-
poration, 25 Utah 2d 96, 476 P.2d 687 (1970). In the 
Willden case, the plaintiff, who was an employee of 
Boyles Brothers Drilling Company, was injured on the 
job and he was then taken to a medical facility nearby, 
maintained by the defendant Kennecott. Later, the 
plaintiff was transported in an ambulance of Kenne-
cott's to Salt Lake City for further treatment and dur-
ing the course of this trip an accident occurred causing 
further injuries to the plaintiff and for which he brought 
that lawsuit. The evidence further indicated in the Will-
den case that the defendant charged $7.50 for its am-
bulance service of the kind involved and that such 
amount would have been billed to the plaintiff and he 
would have been required to pay that amount. On these 
facts, the Trial Judge in the Willden case granted a 
Summary Judgment in favor of the defendant finding 
as a matter of law that the plaintiff was still a guest. 
The Supreme Court reversed and held that a jury ques-
tion existed on that issue. Justices Henriod and Cal-
lister dissented and would have affirmed the Trial 
Court's finding. In the majority opinion, authored by 
Justice Crockett, it was pointed out that there were 
countervailing considerations of Kennecott's being a 
Good Samaritan in furnishing the ride on one hand and 
on the other in wishing to obtain the $7.50 for the car-
riage. Under those circumstances, the Court stated that 
15 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the issue should be submitted to the jury for them to 
make a determination as to "which was the chief induce-
ment for giving the ride", (emphasis added) See also 
Eyre v. Bwdette, 8 Utah 2d 166, 330 P.2d 126 (1958), 
and a lengthy annotation on this subject matter entitled 
"Payment on Expense-Sharing Basis as Affecting Guest 
Status of Automoblie Passenger", 39 A.L.E.3d 1224. 
Turning from the authorities just mentioned to the 
facts in the instant case, it is apparent that the Trial 
Court erred in finding in the instant case that the plain-
tiff was not a guest. In fact, it appears from the Court's 
Memorandum Decision that the Court may have been 
mistaken as to the legal standard to be applied in a case 
of this kind, that being the one enunciated in the Smith 
case and the other authorities cited above and which 
makes critical a determination as to what was the "chief 
inducement" for giving the ride and where both a social 
and a monetary inducement are involved. One of Judge 
Gould's findings recited in his Memorandum Decision 
was as follows: 
"(2) That the parties intended the $5.00 as an 
inducement not for making the trip, but for 
furnishing carriage for the ride to Kay Gof f.'' 
It is clear from the authorities cited above that it 
is not sufficient that it merely have been an inducement 
for the carriage. Bather, it must have been the chief in-
ducement. From Judge Gould's finding, it appears that 
he did not make this critical distinction, although con-
sidering the evidence before him it is evident that he 
could not have found that it was the chief inducement. 
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It is true that there was evidence before the Trial 
Court that the reason that John Goff returned to his 
parents' home was because of the payment of the $5.00. 
John Goff's response to a question on that subject mat-
ter is quoted in the Trial Judge's Memorandum Deci-
sion. However, it is also of some consequence to note 
that this response and the question to which the response 
was given are somewhat ambiguous and as they concern 
the inducement for granting the carriage. That is, it 
does appear from this answer of John Goff's that, at 
least, one of the reasons for him going out of his way 
and up to his parents' home to pick them up was that 
they had given him this money. He didn't testify this 
was his only reason nor does the question asked and 
response given relate to why John Goff took his father 
in the car to Salt Lake City. Certainly, this answer does 
not establish that the chief reason for his father being 
transported at the time of the accident was because the 
father had given $5.00 to John Goff. On the contrary, 
the only testimony on that subject matter from John 
Goff was that he would have made the trip regardless of 
whether or not the money had been paid. On two occas-
sions while being cross-examined by defendant's attor-
ney, John Goff stated that he would have taken his fath-
er regardless of whether or not the latter had paid him 
any money. This was the only testimony that went di-
rectly to that issue and that was given at the trial and 
it is very clear from this testimony that there can only 
be one conclusion as to the chief inducement for the car-
riage. Since John Goff would have taken his father 
whether or not he had been paid the $5.00, it follows in-
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escapably that the chief inducement was a considera-
tion other than his being paid this money. 
It is clear from the Supreme Court's Opinion in the 
Smith case, and to a lesser extent from language found 
in other cases, that the "chief inducement" test requires 
that "except for" the payment of the money, the carriage 
would not have been allowed. As just noted, and con-
sidering the unrebutted testimony of John Goff on this 
subject matter, it is evident that the ride would have 
been given to the father regardless of the payment of 
the $5.00. It is also obvious from other testimony that 
the money was paid not in a commercial sense but that 
it was paid as an act of reciprocation, in order to aid 
the son to eliminate any possibility that the father 
would be a "free-loader" in making the trip and with-
out having paid something to his son. 
While it is apparent from decisions of this Court 
that the issue is one to be submitted to the trier of fact 
and if there is any evidence to sustain a finding that 
the plaintiff is not a guest, that issue should not have 
been ruled upon by the Trial Judge in the instant case. 
This is so because the testimony and circumstances were 
such that the Trial Court should have ruled as a matter 
of law that plaintiff was a guest. In addition to what 
has been stated above, there are other factors which com-
pel the result and these will be stated in the paragraphs 
that follow. 
1. The evidence is clear that the trip that was being 
made at the time of the accident would have been made 
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regardless of whether plaintiff had paid his son the $5.00 
and, in fact, regardless of whether the plaintiff had even 
been along on the trip. Considerable emphasis seems 
to be attached both by plaintiff's attorney and the Trial 
Judge to the fact that the vehicle being driven by the 
defendant had earlier gone out of its way to pick up the 
plaintiff and that a more expeditious route down Inter-
state 15 could have been followed but for the plaintiff 
and his wife and grandson having been picked up. It 
is difficult to understand why this is supposed to 
be significant. The accident did not occur while they were 
on this "side trip" to get the father. If it had, perhaps 
there would be some significance to this "side t r ip" claim. 
However, all of the evidence indicates that the accident 
occurred where the car would have been anyway whether 
the father had paid the $5.00 or whether he had even 
been along. 
2. John Goff did not solicit money from his par-
ents for the trip. As indicated above under the State-
ment of Facts, it is clear from the mother's testimony 
that the payment of the $5.00 was a spontaneous con-
tribution. It is true that some of the testimony of the 
plaintiff is to the contrary, although it is respectfully 
submitted that it would be totally unreasonable to ac-
cept as a fact based upon all of the testimony at the trial 
and also the testimony of the plaintiff in his pretrial de-
position that, in fact, John Goff had solicited payment 
from his parents. 
3. It is clear that there was no pre-arrangement for 
payment by the plaintiff or his wife to John Goff. That 
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is, it is very evident that the trip was going to be made 
and would have been made and that after these plans 
were decided upon that the money was then paid to John 
Goff. Not only did John Goff not solicit the payment 
of that amount but it is apparent that the granting of 
the carriage was not conditioned upon the payment of 
the $5.00. (On this point, see 39A.L.E.3d at Page 1240.) 
4. It is very evident from the overall factual con-
text, and particularly the close family situation that 
existed, that we are involved here with a social situa-
tion and not a commercial situation. With all due re-
spect to those who testified at the trial, it will, of course 
be evident to this Court that none of the Goff family or 
their in-laws would be out anything and if the decision 
were that the plaintiff was not a guest. To the contrary, 
it is perfectly obvious that all of the Goffs knew that 
the only loser under these circumstances would be the 
insurance carrier who covered John Goffs vehicle at 
the time in question. It is further to be noted that in 
this case we have the strongest kind of fact situation 
relating to family ties in that at the time of the acci-
dent John Goff was not only the son of the plaintiff 
who was riding in his car but he was then residing with 
his parents. The parents did not own an automobile and 
he did. That the mother, and plaintiff's wife, was also 
along on the trip as well as this young grandson of whom 
they had charge, strongly indicates the family and so-
cial nature of the trip and as distinguished from its be-
ing some kind of a commercial for hire transportation. 
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5. Some emphasis appears to have been laid on the 
use that was actually made of the money that was paid 
to John Goff by his father. That is, there was testimony 
that $4.00 of this very $5.00 was used that morning to 
purchase gas for the trip and that the other $1.00 was 
later spent by John Goff for his lunch. It is submitted 
that the specific use made of that $5.00 is irrelevant. 
The evidence is clear that the trip would have been made 
regardless of this payment. Firm arrangements had al-
ready been made by John Goff's then fiancee and the 
other brother's then fiancee to make the trip to Salt 
Lake in connection with their Tupperware work. There 
is nothing to indicate that either of the girls was con-
tributing anything for their transportation and this is 
understandable considering that one was John's fiancee 
and the other John's brother's fiancee, and whom both 
have since married. Obviously, and considering this re-
lationship, it is apparent that John would have allowed 
the girls to make the trip without charge and regardless 
of what his father had done. It is absolutely naive to 
suggest under these circumstances and where the trip 
was being made anyway that if the father had not paid 
the $5.00 that they wouldn't have allowed him to ride. 
The only reasonable interpretation that can be made is 
that he would have been allowed to ride anyway and that 
the payment of $5.00 was simply a courtesy payment to 
the son. Moreover, John Goff testified that he was work-
ing regularly at that time and receiving a regular salary. 
Thus, he had money of his own, and clearly could have 
met the expense for this trip and without being paid any-
thing by his father. 
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POINT II 
NO BUSINESS TRIP WAS INVOLVED AT 
THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT THAT 
COULD REMOVE THE PLAINTIFF FROM 
THE EFFECT OF THE GUEST STATUTE. 
The other finding of the Trial Court recited in his 
Memorandum Decision was the following. 
"(1) The trip was a business trip and not a so-
cial trip for all persons in the car except John 
Goff." 
Although the claimed significance of this finding or 
conclusion to the Court's Decision that the plaintiff was 
not a guest is not elaborated upon by the Trial Judge, 
presumably it was his conclusion that plaintiff escaped 
being a guest both by reason of his payment of the $5.00 
and also because he was part of a business trip or joint 
enterprise at the time. 
This Court has ruled upon the question of a joint 
enterprise and its effect upon the guest statute in Mu-
hasey v. Aaron, 20 Utah 2d 383, 438 P.2d 702 (1968). 
In that case, two young friends and college students were 
traveling and working together in the Western United 
States. In connection with this plan, the plaintiff, Mu-
kasey, signed a contract with an automobile drive-away 
company in Denver enabling him to drive a car to Los 
Angeles and under certain conditions specified in the 
contract. Thereafter, the two started out for Los An-
geles and with an agreement between them whereby they 
would share expenses of the automobile and they would 
share the driving of the automobile to Los Angeles. 
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While driving through Utah and with the defendant 
driving, an accident occurred and both young men were 
injured. The plaintiff passenger then sued the defen-
dant driver contending that he was entitled to recover 
against the driver, and based upon simple negligence 
only, since the guest statute did not apply because there 
was a joint enterprise. On this subject matter, Justice 
Tuckett speaking for the majority stated: 
"We are in accord with the general rule that if 
the parties were engaged in a joint enterprise 
that relationship would be sufficient to remove 
the case from the provisions of the guest statute." 
The court then considered what is required for this 
relationship and stated as follows: 
"The elements which are essential to a joint en-
terprise are commonly stated to be four: (1) an 
agreement, express or implied, among the mem-
bers of the group; (2) a common purpose to be 
carried out by the group; (3) a community of 
pecuniary interest in that purpose, among the 
members; and (4) an equal right to a voice in the 
direction of the enterprise, which gives an equal 
right of control." 
In Mukasey, the Trial Court had granted a Sum-
mary Judgment in favor of the driver defendant. The 
Supreme Court affirmed and held that this was proper 
since even if the evidence was reviewed most favorably 
to the plaintiff it would not show that the parties were 
engaged in a joint enterprise. The Court then went on 
to state: 
"The evidence fails to show that the object of a 
journey involved a common business purpose or 
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that a financial or pecuniary interest was in-
volved which is essential to show that the parties 
were engaged in a joint venture or joint enter-
prise." 
In Mukasey, Justice Ellett dissented and on the 
basis that the plaintiff was the host and the defendant 
was the guest and that therefore the guest statute had 
no application under those circumstances. Of course, 
that factual situation is not involved in the instant case 
and there is nothing in Justice Ellett's dissent to indi-
cate that he disagreed with the majority on the joint 
enterprise issue referred to above. 
In the instant case,, it appears that the Trial Judge 
believed that a business trip or joint enterprise was in-
volved with all occupants of the car other than the own-
er John Groff and that therefore the guest statute did not 
apply to plaintiff's claim against the defendant. If this 
is what the Trial Court decided, it is apparent that the 
evidence before him was totally lacking to sustain any 
such finding or conclusion. It is apparent from a re-
view of the four elements of a joint enterprise referred 
to above from the Mukasey case that none are present 
under the facts of the instant case and as between the 
plaintiff and defendant. There was certainly no agree-
ment between the two, either express or implied, and con-
cerning the carriage and except possibly that which 
would be involved in any kind of a social situation. Even 
more obvious is that there was no "common business pur-
pose or that a financial or pecuniary interest was in-, 
volved". In fact, the purpose of the driver defendant, 
Annette Doble Goff, in going to her Tupperware sales 
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meeting was totally different from the purpose of plain-
tiff in going to the Railroad Retirement Board to dis-
cuss a claim involving prior injuries. Nor, does there 
seem to have been any possible business purpose for 
plaintiff's wife and their infant grandson to have been 
in the car at the time. Certainly, any business purpose 
the plaintiff had (i.e. going to the Railroad Retirement 
Board to see about his claim) had absolutely no rela-
tionship in a business sense to what the driver or any-
one else in the car was doing or intending to do. With 
all due respect to Judge Gould, it is difficult to under-
stand what he conceived to be the legal significance of 
this finding quoted at the first of the Argument under 
this Point II and it is even more difficult to understand 
what the factual basis is for that finding. 
CONCLUSION 
In this case the Trial Court sitting without a jury 
found that the plaintiff was not a guest since he paid 
compensation for the ride and also found that the trip 
was a "business trip" and that presumably therefore, 
this also excluded plaintiff from being a guest. Neither 
of these findings has any support in the evidence. The 
factual background involved in this case concerns a fam-
ily situation with the strongest possible implications of 
a social, as distinguished from a commercial type of sit-
uation or a ride for hire type of situation. It is clear 
that the $5.00 that was paid by the plaintiff for the ride 
was merely a token of reciprocation or appreciation and 
it was definitely not the chief inducement for the car-
riage furnished the plaintiff and if it was any induce-
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ment at all. This is so, for among other reasons, since it 
is clear that the same trip would have been made re-
gardless of this payment or even if the plaintiff had 
not been present on the trip. There was no business re-
lationship of any kind between the plaintiff and anyone 
else in the car and the reasons the driver-defendant and 
plaintiff-passenger were making the trip were totally 
different and unrelated. 
The Judgment of the Trial Court should be revers-
ed and this Court should enter a Judgment in favor of 
the defendant of no cause of action. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STRONG & HANNI 
By DAVID K. WINDER 
604 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
; Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
26 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the fore-
going Brief to Eichard Richards, Attorney for Plaintiff-
Respondent, 670 28th Street, Ogden, Utah 84403, this 
jji. day of February, 1975. 
DAVID K. WINDER 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
RECEIVED 
LAW LIBRARY 
DEC 9 1975 
BRIGUAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY 
J . Reuben Clark Law School 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
